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Electoral Competition after Party Splits
Abstract
While party splits are a relatively frequent phenomenon in many new and established
democracies, the systematic empirical research on electoral competition after schisms
is limited. The analysis of more than 200 splits across 25 European countries in the
post-war period addresses this gap in the literature. The study shows that the vote
share of rump and splinter parties in the first election after fission are strongly related
to their membership strength and the share of splinter legislators. This relationship
is present in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally,
economic growth affects the support of rump parties that hold government office while
party system fragmentation and party funding regulations correlate with the electoral
performance of splinter parties.
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Introduction
Political parties play a key role in a modern representative democracy by providing structure
to political competition in elections and legislatures, facilitating voter representation and account-
ability, and mobilizing voters. Parties’ ability to fulfil these functions depends crucially on their
stability and unity. Political science research has therefore analyzed extensively the causes and
consequences of parties’ disunity in legislative voting and party switching by individual legislators.
Sometimes, however, party unity breaks to such an extent that the party splits permanently in
the sense that some of its members establish a new splinter party that competes with the rump
party in the next electoral cycle.1 The outcomes of this post-fission competition vary greatly. For
example, the Popular Unity party in Greece, established by the MPs of the Syriza party who
disagreed with the terms of the Greek bailout by the EU, gained less than 3 percent of the vote
in the September 2015 election, while the Syriza party lost less than 1 percentage point of its
vote in comparison to the previous election. In contrast, the Social Democratic Party in the UK
(established in 1981 by a group of deputies from the Labour party) won a respectable 11.6 percent
of the vote in the 1983 general election. As a result of this split, the rump Labour party obtained
only 27.6 percent of the vote, thus losing more than 9 percentage points of its support relative to
the 1979 election. In other cases the splinter party performs even better than the rump party. This
was the case in the 1998 election in Denmark, when the Progress Party received 2.4 percent of the
vote, while its splinter, the Danish People’s Party, gained 7.4 percent.
What factors determine this substantial variation in parties’ aggregate electoral support after
splits? Currently the scholarship lacks a systematic comparative study investigating this question
empirically. The extant research on new parties suggests electoral demands and political opportu-
nity structures such as institutional thresholds and party competition as the main explanations of
the electoral performance of new parties. However, it is not clear whether these explanations can
account for the electoral support of both genuinely new and splinter parties. Similarly, there is little
research on the extent to which these theories can explain the dynamics in the electoral support
of both these established parties that experienced splits and those that compete with new parties
1The rump party is defined here as the main successor party, which is the most continuous with regard to the
original party before fission in organizational terms, and which normally keeps the name of this original, “parent”
party.
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that are not their own splinters. Also, the importance of party organization and candidates for
the electoral competition between new and established parties is under-researched in the literature.
This study addresses these gaps by examining how rump and splinter parties perform in the first
election after fission using a new dataset on splits in 25 EU member states in the post-war period.
The research makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it examines whether the factors
suggested by the electoral demand, institutional and party competition explanations are able to
account for the electoral support of both rump and splinter parties. Second, it elaborates and
tests the argument that the appeal of rump and splinter parties’ candidates and their membership
strength account for the electoral competition after splits.
Understanding the variation in parties’ electoral support after fission is important for several
reasons. First, voter response to splits determines their impact on party system stabilization and
change in terms of the number and identity of relevant parties and the patterns of cooperation and
competition among them. Splits can change the legislative strength of parties and their bargaining
power in a single legislative period (Laver and Benoit, 2003). However, party fission can be even
more consequential if/when splits are followed by a substantial electoral change. The first election
after the schism is particularly crucial, as it shows whether the splinter party has the potential
to become a viable player in the party system on the long term, and whether the rump party is
likely to remain relevant after its split. In established party systems, the electoral change related
to fission may be substantial enough to change radically the patterns of party competition and
cooperation, as for example in Ireland after the emergence of the Progressive Democrats (PD) as
a splinter party of Fianna Fail in the late 1980s. In young party systems, frequent splits that lead
to the redistribution of parties’ support could impede the emergence of a stable set of parties and
structured patterns of cooperation among them. This usually translates into low levels of citizens’
trust in political parties and poor quality of representation and electoral accountability.
Second, electoral change induced by splits can also deprive substantial voter groups of legislative
representation and shift public policies toward the over-represented minority groups. For instance,
numerous splits of Polish right-wing parties before the 1993 election explain to a large extent their
failure to reach the electoral threshold in that election, leading to the formation of the centre-left
government supported by only a minority of the electorate.
Third, explaining the patterns of electoral change after splits is key for understanding the
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persistence of individual parties. While some scholars demonstrate that splits lead to the electoral
decline of parties (Bakke and Sitter, 2013), not all splits have the same effect on party persistence
as illustrated by the examples discussed above. However, under what conditions splits are most
likely to lead to party disappearance represents an under-researched question in the literature.
Last but not least, the empirical prevalence of splits justifies further the study of their electoral
implications. As discussed below, in 25 countries analyzed here, more than one third of electoral
periods witnessed an emergence of a splinter party. In some countries, especially in younger democ-
racies of Central and Eastern Europe, splits were frequent enough so that their impact on electoral
outcomes was considered as more important than that of parties’ policy positions (Kaminski, 2001,
294).
The study first critically reviews the most prominent theoretical explanations in the literature.
It then presents the theoretical hypotheses on how candidate appeal and membership size affect the
electoral support of parties after splits. Next, the design and results of the analysis are presented.
The concluding section summarizes the findings and their implications.
Explaining party success after splits: electoral demands, institu-
tions and party competition
Electoral demand, institutional thresholds and party competition have been suggested in the
literature as the main explanations of the electoral performance of both genuinely new and splinter
parties (Selb and Pituctin, 2010). However, the literature has not systematically considered how
the specific context characterizing the emergence of splinter parties affects the extent to which they
can account for electoral dynamics after splits. I address this gap by discussing the implications
of this context, focusing in particular on the organizational and programmatic links between the
splinter and the parent party that makes the former less “new” in comparison to a genuinely new
party (Barnea and Rahat, 2011).2
Specifically, influential arguments in the literature suggest that the electoral success of new
2I draw mostly on the literature on all new parties (i.e. genuinely new and splinter parties (Hug, 2001)) for
developing the theoretical framework of this study because the systematic comparative research focusing on splinter
parties only has so far examined only the causes of splits (Ceron, 2015; Mutlu-Eren, 2015) or party switching by
individual legislators (Desposato, 2006; O’Brien and Shomer, 2013).
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parties is unlikely when the electorate has strong partisan attachments to the established parties
or when the latter are embedded in well-developed and stable cleavages. However, a split may
undermine or weaken voters’ attachments to the rump party given that stable parties are a key
condition for the development of voter partisanship (Dalton and Weldon, 2007; Lupu and Stokes,
2009). Moreover, the splinter party may attract some partisan voters of its parent party by claiming
to be a “true” representative of its identity. Similarly, both rump and splinter parties, as successors
of the parent party, can credibly claim to be representatives of the same social groups associated
with this party. For example, Aimer and Vowles (1993) show that in the 1990 parliamentary election
in New Zealand, the splinter of the Labour party (called the New Labour Party) drew its support
primarily from the traditional Labour electoral base, namely the working class voters. Also, the
Most-Hid party founded by a former leader of the main ethnic Hungarian minority party in Slovakia
(Party of the Hungarian Coalition), attracted a substantial share of the ethnic Hungarian voters
in the 2010 parliamentary election that previously supported its parent party. Thus, the extent to
which voter partisanship and well-developed cleavage structures insulate the rump party from the
damaging electoral consequences of splits and prevent the electoral breakthrough of new splinter
parties is unclear.
Another demand-side explanation emphasizes poor economic conditions, which should increase
the support of new parties (Hanley and Sikk, 2014; Tavits, 2008) because voters seek alternatives
to the established parties. However, since splinter parties are less “new” due to their previous
organizational links with their parent parties, they may not be able to benefit from voter frustration
brought about the mismanagement of the economy. This is especially likely to be the case if their
parent parties were in government, because voters can then associate the splinter parties with
the policies of the parent party that led to poor economic outcomes. Furthermore, splits may
intermediate the effect of economic factors on the electoral performance of rump parties because
fission can be viewed as an indication of the disunity within these parties. The perceived lack
of cohesion of incumbent rump parties could reduce the clarity of their responsibility for policy
outcomes (Powell and Whitten, 1993), or the credibility of the rump parties that are in opposition
at the time of a split as alternative governments in waiting (Anderson, 2000).
Institutional explanations suggest that new parties are more successful under more proportional
electoral institutions or party funding regimes that do not favour established parties. However, in
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comparison to genuinely new parties, splinter parties may find it easier to establish their electoral
or financial viability because they frequently include prominent elites from the parent party. The
effect of institutional thresholds on the electoral success of rump and splinter parties would then
be weakened.
Finally, factors related to party competition may also affect the electoral success of new parties.
For example, new parties are more successful when established parties are not able or willing to
address salient issues that are picked up by new parties or when new parties are ideologically distant
from their established competitors (Hino, 2012; Hug, 2001; Meguid, 2005; Selb and Pituctin, 2010).
Furthermore, higher party system fragmentation signals an open electoral market in which new
parties may be serious contenders for legislative seats and government office (Mainwaring, Gervasoni
and España-Najera, 2016), thus increasing the electoral success of new parties at the expense of
established parties (see also Kselman, Powell and Tucker 2016). These arguments assume that
successful new parties are able to differentiate themselves in ideological and policy terms from their
established competitors. The latter assumption could however be questioned due to the (recent)
affiliation of the members of splinter parties with at least one of the older parties.
Party candidates and members
Apart from the aforementioned research, a smaller number of studies on new parties suggest that
the resources of the new party matter for its initial success. For example, Bolin (2010), Lucardie
(2000) and Sikk (2006) argue that the new party needs members, leadership, media access and
money to become visible to the electorate as a credible contender. Without spending sufficient
resources to promote its message, the new party is unlikely to attract many voters. A number
of scholars of new radical right parties have also emphasized the importance of leadership and
organization, although these effects are debated in the literature (see Mudde 2007 for a review of
these arguments). This is mainly because systematic empirical tests of the effect of the resources of
new parties on their success remain an exception rather than a rule (Golder, 2016, 489). However,
several case studies on splits suggest that the electoral success of rump and splinter parties depended
on the personal popularity of their leaders and candidates (Aimer and Vowles, 1993; Crewe and
King, 1995; Ivaldi, 2003; Rybár and Deegan-Krause, 2008) and the strength of party organization
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(Hanley, 2008; Luther, 2008).
These arguments are also in line with the criticisms of other explanations outlined above. Thus,
in the context where group loyalties, partisanship, performance evaluations, party programmes or
electoral viability potentially provide only limited cues to voters when choosing between rump and
splinter parties, such considerations as the personal appeal of parties’ candidates and leaders and
their membership strength are likely to have an important effect on vote choice. More specifi-
cally, the electoral performance of the splinter party may be improved if the elites of the parent
party that join it have high name recognition, thus increasing the splinter party’s visibility to the
electorate. Furthermore, and probably more importantly, the splinter party may benefit from the
personal electoral appeal of the switcher elites. A number of studies in the voting behaviour liter-
ature indicate that personal voting, both due to the policy positions or the perceived competence
and personalities of leaders and candidates, matters for voters’ party choices (Karp et al., 2002;
McAllister, 2007; Moser and Scheiner, 2005; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007).
Conversely, the rump party that loses leaders and candidates with high name recognition and/or
personal appeal is unlikely to be able to replace them with the politicians of equal standing, at
least not before the next parliamentary election. In line with this argument I develop the following
two hypotheses:
H1: The electoral support of the rump party is lower if the candidates of the splinter party have
high name recognition and personal appeal.
H2: The electoral support of the splinter party is higher if its candidates have high name recog-
nition and personal appeal.
Large membership is also important for the electoral success of both rump and splinter parties.
Party members provide a pool of loyal voters, spread the party’s message through their personal
social networks, serve as a workforce that can effectively mobilize electoral support for the party
during electoral campaigns, inform the party about the public opinion at the grass-roots level, and
signal the legitimacy of the party to the electorate (Scarrow, 2015; Tavits, 2013).3 Thus, large
membership helps splinter parties to establish themselves as viable contenders, while for rump
parties it is a way to assure their continued relevance following a split. Based on this logic, I expect
3The present study defines party members as those members who are affiliated with the party as individuals and
through formal procedures of affiliation (cf. Scarrow 2015).
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that:
H3: A larger membership of the rump party increases its electoral support.
H4: A larger membership of the splinter party increases its electoral support.
Before proceeding to the empirical section, it is important to note that the literature also
suggests important counter-arguments to the hypotheses presented above. Specifically, several
scholars have stressed that the effects of leader and candidate evaluations on vote choice are limited
(Karvonen, 2007; King, 2002; Tverdova, 2011). Similarly, a number of studies question the impact
of party organization on parties’ electoral performance (see Tavits (2013, 36-38) for a review of
these arguments), especially in the context of its decline in Western European democracies in
the last several decades, and the low levels of party membership in most young democracies even
decades after their democratic transitions. Furthermore, studies on radical right parties argue that
party organization is important only for their electoral consolidation and persistence but not for an
initial breakthrough (Art, 2011; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). These counter-arguments
suggest that there is a certain level of theoretical ambiguity/controversy in the scholarship over the
effect of these two explanatory factors and provide further theoretical justification for testing the
aforementioned hypotheses systematically in a large-n analysis.
Data and measurement
The theoretical expectations are tested using an original dataset on party splits that occurred in
25 member states of the European Union in the post-war period.4 The analysis includes the splits
of the parties that obtained at least 3 percent of seats in the lower house of the national legislature
in the last election before a split (however, no threshold of electoral support was applied when
measuring the vote share of rump and splinter parties after a split). This selection criterion allows
me to consider almost all parties that are relevant for government formation and policymaking in
the selected set of countries. In contrast, the splits of small and/or ephemeral parties are less likely
to matter substantively because the parties that experience these splits have little influence, and
such splits are also unlikely to lead to the emergence of splinter parties that are sufficiently large to
be relevant for government formation or policymaking. The findings of the study are therefore not
4To identify the splits, 286 electoral periods were examined. The list of countries and time periods is provided in
Online Appendix B.
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generalizable to the latter set of splits. Moreover, from a more practical point of view, a threshold
of relevance is required since the splits of very small parties are much harder to record and also
raise difficulties with regard to the measurement of key predictor variables, such as membership
strength or personal appeal of leaders and candidates.
The dataset distinguishes between individual parties and electoral coalitions that are present
in both Western and Central and Eastern European countries (Golder, 2006; Greene and Haber,
2016b; Ibenskas, 2016). The break-ups of electoral coalitions are therefore not considered as party
splits. The main criterion for identifying an organization as an individual party was whether it could
recruit individual members without the latter automatically becoming the members of the broader
alliance or coalition that this organization was a member of. Thus, highly factionalized parties, such
as the Christian Democracy in Italy, were coded as parties given that they were characterized by
the existence of the unified membership organization despite well-established factional affiliations
of individual members.
Measurement of dependent variables
Party splits were identified based on the triangulation of information from a variety of academic,
media and official sources.5 As mentioned above, in order to reduce the chances of selecting only
electorally successful splits, no minimum threshold of electoral success of splinter parties was used
for coding party splits and substantial effort was made to identify the splinter parties with very
limited electoral support. Furthermore, the analysis excludes the splits of the merged parties that
were formed in the same period when the split occurred, and it also does not consider splits if the
parent or splinter party merged with another party after the split. These “split-mergers” are more
complex phenomena than simple splits, and therefore the theoretical expectations of this study
may only partially apply to them.
The total count of splinter parties included in the sample was 228. They were formed as a
5In the absolute majority of cases the identification of successor parties as either rump or splinter parties was
straightforward because data sources specify explicitly which party was a new party founded by a faction from
another party. Furthermore, splinter parties adopt the names that are distinct from those of their parent parties
in order to differentiate themselves electorally and/or to comply with the legal regulation of parties by the state.
In several cases where organizational continuity between the parent and rump parties was not straightforward to
establish (e.g. where due to the split both successor parties adopt the names that were different from that of their
parent party), the successor party founded by the largest organizational faction was considered as a rump party
(following the approach suggested by Bolleyer (2013, 26)).
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results of splits in 136 parent parties.6 These splits occurred in 120 electoral periods or 42 percent
of the total number of periods included in the sample. Italy has had the highest number of splinter
parties (25). Among the older European democracies, also France and the Netherlands experienced
the formation of more than 10 splinter parties. However, splits on average were more frequent
in newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, with almost one half (110) splinter parties
coming from this region, even if the length of democratic experience of these countries has been
substantially shorter when compared to Western and Southern European countries.
The dependent variables in the cross-national analysis are the individual and combined vote
shares of the rump and splinter parties.7 While the theoretical hypotheses refer to the individual
electoral success of rump and splinter parties, understanding the total support of successor parties
is also of interest because it also indirectly represents the vote share of the parties other than the
rump and splinter parties. Thus, the analysis of this variable indicates when a split of a party
benefits other parties in the system, either because they attract the supporters of the party that
experienced a split or because these voters abstain.
Since some parties split more than once in a single electoral period, the unit of analysis in the
model that explains the support of splinter parties is the dyad of the splinter party and electoral
period. The models that explain the performance of rump parties and the combined support of
rump and splinter parties use the dyads of rump parties and electoral periods as units of analysis.
Measurement of predictor variables
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the effect of candidates’ personal popularity and name recog-
nition, the analysis uses the ratio between the number of lower chamber legislators of the parent
party who joined the splinter party at the time of a split and the total number of MPs.8 This
measure is in line with the causal mechanisms of Hypotheses 1 and 2 as incumbent MPs have on
average a stronger personal popularity and name recognition than other candidates. Moreover,
given the focus of this study on party electoral success in parliamentary elections, it is important
6However, the number of parent party - electoral period dyads was 192 because some parties split in two or more
electoral terms.
7For the parties that lack individual vote share records due to their participation in electoral alliances, the share
of the vote is estimated as the product of the electoral strength of the alliance and the share of the legislators that
the party obtained from the total number of legislators won by the coalition.
8The number of switcher MPs was identified on the basis of various country-specific and comparative studies on
parties, media sources, and the records on party affiliation provided on the websites of legislatures concerned.
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that incumbent legislators are more likely to participate in these elections in comparison to, for
example, parliamentary candidates in the previous national election that did not win seats.
The main measure used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4 on the effect of party membership organiza-
tion is the ratio between the number of members of the parent party and the size of the electorate.9
The ratio between the size of party membership and the electorate is recognized in the literature as
one of the most established measures of the strength of party membership (Katz and Mair, 1994;
Tavits, 2013). While the estimates or records of the size of party membership suffer from the prob-
lems related to their reliability and comparability, especially in a cross-national context, they still
provide among the best available proxies and correlate highly with with the declared membership
in mass surveys (Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012).
Although separate measures of the membership strength of rump and splinter parties would
provide a more direct test of Hypotheses 3 and 4, they are also characterized by missing data.
Specifically, the information on party membership is not available for 57 percent of splinter parties
and 9 percent of rump parties. For the observations that the data is available for the membership
of parent parties correlates highly with that of rump parties (the value of the correlation coefficient
is 0.93) but not with the membership of splinter parties (the correlation coefficient equals 0.28).
Thus, the membership of the parent party captures well the membership of the rump parties, but
it is only a proxy measure of the membership of the splinter party. To improve the empirical test
of Hypothesis 4, I also present the analyses that use the ratio between the number of members in
splinter parties and the size of the electorate. These analyses thus cover 43 percent of the splinter
parties in the sample.
The measures for electoral demands, institutional thresholds and party competition are the
following. Voter partisanship is operationalized as the age of the parent party in the year of the split.
The embedment of the parent party in a strong cleavage structure is captured by the dichotomous
variable that indicates communist and social democratic parties in countries with high trade union
density (the threshold of 30 percent, which is close to the median value observed in the sample, is
used; the data is provided by Visser 2013). Such leftist parties that represent an organized working
class should be less likely to lose votes after splits in line with the theoretical discussion above. The
dichotomous variable for the presence of rump parties in government within one year before the
9Online Appendix A provides detailed information on the sources used to code this variable.
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election, interacted with the rate of economic growth, tests the argument of retrospective economic
voting. Effective electoral threshold (Lijphart, 1994), the values of which are provided by Carey
and Hix (2011), measures electoral system disproportionality. The access of new splinter parties
to financial resources is captured by a dichotomous variable that indicates whether direct public
funding provided by national government was available only to the parties with representation at
the national legislature (coded based on the information provided by Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (2012) and Biezen (2013)). Such a restrictive funding regime may limit the
ability of new parties to achieve an electoral breakthrough in line with the arguments on cartel
parties (Katz and Mair, 1995; Potter and Tavits, 2015).
The importance of party competition is examined using three variables. The first one indicates
whether the ideological families of the rump and splinter parties are different.10 This variable
serves as a proxy for the positional differences between the successor parties on the key dimensions
of party competition and the salience they attach to different issues.11 Higher number of issues
that are not addressed by the main established parties in their programmes could also increase the
support of the splinter party by providing it with more “political space”. Following Zons (2015),
this measure was constructed based on the information from the Manifesto Project Database as the
number of the coding categories that were not addressed in established parties’ manifestoes at the
time of the first election after fission. Additionally, party system fragmentation is measured by the
effective number of parties (data provided by Gallagher 2016). Finally, the analyses also control
for the presence of the splinter party in government within one year before the election, multiple
splits of the same party in a single electoral period, and the vote share of the parent party in the
last national parliamentary election before a split.
10The variable therefore also captures the arguments about the importance of the ideology of new parties for their
electoral success. Its coding was based on the scheme of Döring and Manow (2012), who distinguish between 11 party
families; they also provided the information on the families of most parties in the sample. The missing information
was coded based on comparative handbooks on party politics, such as Bugajski (2002), and various country-specific
sources.
11In the absence of detailed information on the policies of most splinter parties because of their small size, it was
not possible to construct more direct measures of the response of the established parties (including rump parties) to
the emergence of splinter parties as used by, for example, Meguid (2005) or Hino (2012).
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Analysis and results
Electoral performance after splits: descriptive analysis
Figure 1 presents the electoral performance of rump and splinter parties in the first election
after the split (plotted on Y axis) in comparison to the vote share of the parent party in the last
election before the split (plotted on X axis). The figure also includes 45 degree lines to differentiate
between the cases where a successor party’s (or parties’) support was higher than that of its (their)
parent party.
Figure 1: Party vote before and after fission
Note: observations from Western Europe are represented by black points while the gray points
indicate the Central and Eastern European cases.
The figure demonstrates several interesting patterns in the variation in the electoral performance
of parties after splits. First, the scatterplot on the left indicates strong correlation (the correlation
coefficient is equal to 0.79) between the support of rump and parent parties. On average, rump
parties tend to lose only some support in comparison to their parent parties but there is a non-
negligible group of rump parties, mostly in post-communist democracies, that perform substantially
worse than their parent parties. Second, as shown by the middle scatterplot, the vote share of
splinter parties tends to be much lower than and correlates only weakly (at 0.24) with that of their
parent parties. Third, the total support of successor parties tends to be close to that of their parent
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parties (the value of the correlation coefficient is 0.86), which suggests that the patterns of vote
redistribution after splits occur first and foremost among the successor parties as opposed to voter
switching to other parties that are not related to the split.
Modelling strategy
As Figure 1 shows, the distribution of parties’ vote shares after splits is highly skewed to
the right. Several predictor variables are also characterised by right-skewness. Two modelling
strategies are adopted to deal with this challenge. First, Models 1-4 in Table 1 present linear multi-
level models (with random intercept terms for countries, elections and parent parties) in which
parties’ vote shares and right-skewed predictor variables (the share of splinter MPs, membership
and electorate ratio, party age, effective electoral threshold and the vote share of the parent party)
are logged.12 Due to logarithmic transformations, the regression coefficients do not represent the
change in raw vote shares for one unit change in predictor variables. Thus, Figure 2 presents the
substantive effects of the share of splinter MPs and party membership. Second, Models 4-6 are
robust regression models with raw vote shares as dependent variables.13
Since the literature on new parties emphasizes important differences between established and
new democracies, both linear multi-level and robust regression models are estimated for Western
European and younger Central and Eastern European democracies. Tables 2 and 3 present the
results of these analyses.
The literature also indicates that the studies of new party electoral performance may be suscep-
tible to selection bias because some of the factors that affect new party success could also impact
on their emergence (Golder, 2003; Hug, 2001). To account for this possibility, Online Appendix
B presents the results of Heckman’s sample selection models, where the selection equation models
party splits by using the factors suggested in the existing studies on party splits and new party
entry, while the outcome equation models the electoral support of rump and splinter parties. The
12Since for some parties that participated in electoral alliances the estimated vote share was 0, the constant of 0.5
was added to the dependent variables before their logarithmic transformations. The constant of the same magnitude
was also added to the variable that captures the share of splinter MPs because some splinter parties were not joined
by any MPs.
13MM-estimator is probably the most commonly employed robust regression technique due to their high breakdown
point (i.e. the minimum percentage of extreme observations that can lead to the estimator producing arbitrary results)
and high efficiency (Andersen, 2008). The models were estimated using the robustbase package in the R statistical
environment (Rousseeuw et al., 2016).
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substantive results do not change when sample selection models are used.
Candidates’ appeal and party membership
The results support Hypotheses 1 and 2: a higher share of switcher legislators increases the
electoral support of splinter parties and decreases the vote share of rump parties (Models 1-3 and
5-7). The magnitude of these effects is substantial. According to Figure 2, the increase in the share
of splinter MPs from 0 to 7 percent (corresponding roughly to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the
observed distribution of this variable) decreases the expected vote share of the rump party from 9
percent to 6 percent and increases the expected vote share of the splinter party from 0.5 percent to
2 percent. The robust regression estimates suggest stronger effects. According to Models 5 and 6,
the increase in the share of splinter MPs by 1 percentage point leads to the loss of 0.83 percentage
points of the vote for the rump party and the gain of 0.38 percentage points for the splinter party.
Thus, the exit of 7 percent of national legislators translates into the loss of almost 6 percent of
the vote for the rump party and the gain of almost 3 percent for the splinter party. The results
largely hold for both Western European and Central and Eastern European sub-samples (Tables 2
and 3), although the statistical and substantive significance of the effects of party membership is
somewhat stronger in the former than in the latter.
However, the effect of the share of splinter MPs on the combined vote share of rump and splinter
parties is significant (at the 0.1 level) only in Model 8, but not in Model 4. Thus, there is only
limited evidence that a greater extent of fission at the parliamentary elite level benefits other parties
in the system, although multiple splits do so.14
Hypothesis 3 is also substantiated. As Figure 2 shows, the estimates of Model 1 indicate that
the increase in the member-electorate ratio of the parent party from 0.1 to 5 percent (these values
roughly correspond to the 10th and 90th percentiles of the observed distribution) increases the
expected vote share of the rump party from 6 to 10 percent. According to the estimates of Model
5, the increase in the membership-electorate ratio by 1 percentage point leads to the increase in
14Specifically, rump parties perform significantly worse (by 3.8 percentage points according to Model 5) when
multiple splits occur in a single electoral period, but this variable has no effect on the support of splinter parties
(Models 2 and 6). However, multiple splits decrease the total support of successor parties (Models 4 and 8), which
suggests that they benefit other parties in the system. A possible interpretation of these results is that the emergence
of every additional splinter party, independently of how many legislators join it, strengthens the perception that the
rump party is divided, thus increasing its electoral losses (cf. Greene and Haber 2016a).
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Table 1: Electoral competition after splits: full sample
Linear multi-level regression Robust regression
Rump Splinter Rump+ Rump Splinter Rump+
splinter splinter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.60 −0.83 −0.20 0.48 7.57∗ −0.65 −0.71 3.29
(0.35) (0.44) (0.75) (0.30) (2.35) (0.45) (1.33) (2.43)
Share of splinter MPs −0.15∗ 0.52∗ 0.36∗ −0.00 −0.83∗ 0.38∗ 0.32∗ −0.34
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.08) (0.18)
Member-electorate ratio (parent party) 0.12∗ 0.11∗ 0.11∗ 0.71∗ 0.05 0.55∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.19) (0.04) (0.20)
Member-electorate ratio (splinter party) 0.21∗ 3.76
(0.06) (2.02)
Socdem or communist & high 0.10 0.04 0.47∗ 0.13 1.42 −0.00 0.47 1.10
union density (0.10) (0.12) (0.22) (0.08) (1.03) (0.20) (0.64) (1.07)
Parent party age −0.02 0.07 0.11 0.02 −0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Economic growth −0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.12 −0.00 0.04 −0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.18) (0.03) (0.15) (0.19)
Rump party in government −0.44∗ 0.21 −0.02 −0.31∗ −5.02∗ 0.31 −0.01 −5.33∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.27) (0.09) (1.10) (0.20) (0.79) (1.17)
Rump party in gov * economic growth 0.07∗ −0.03 −0.01 0.03 0.65∗ −0.03 −0.09 0.72∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.25) (0.05) (0.18) (0.27)
Effective electoral threshold 0.03 −0.00 0.02 0.02 2.18 −0.39 −0.33 3.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (4.42) (0.86) (2.51) (4.65)
Direct public funding for leg. parties only 0.08 −0.36∗ −0.53∗ −0.05 2.00 −0.49∗ −1.22∗ 0.75
(0.11) (0.15) (0.21) (0.09) (1.08) (0.22) (0.58) (1.12)
Effective number of parties −0.04 0.12∗ 0.11∗ 0.01 −0.84∗ 0.13∗ 0.11 −0.36
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.26) (0.05) (0.13) (0.27)
No of zero categories −0.00 0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.12 0.02 0.02 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09)
Different ideologies 0.03 0.19∗ 0.48∗ 0.15∗ 1.59 0.20 1.13∗ 2.05∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.07) (0.92) (0.18) (0.54) (0.96)
Splinter in government −0.14 0.10 −0.13 −0.09 −1.21 0.27 −0.29 −0.80
(0.17) (0.21) (0.31) (0.15) (1.88) (0.39) (1.00) (2.00)
Multiple splits −0.44∗ −0.13 0.15 −0.33∗ −3.81∗ −0.09 0.47 −2.42
(0.12) (0.12) (0.22) (0.10) (1.19) (0.18) (0.59) (1.23)
Previous vote 0.90∗ 0.09 0.20 0.82∗ 0.79∗ 0.01 0.02 0.86∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Party-level variance 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.00
Election-level variance 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.00
Country-level variance 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01
Residual variance 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.20
Number of parties 136 129 76 136
Number of elections 120 120 71 120
Number of countries 25 25 23 25
N 192 228 98 192 192 228 98 192
Log Likelihood -180.26 -258.65 -123.49 -152.12
Note: dependent variables in Models 1-4 are logged vote shares of rump and splinter parties and the variables capturing the share
of splinter MPs, membership-electorate ratio, party age and effective threshold are also logged in these models. MM-estimator
used for robust regression models. ∗p < 0.05
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Figure 2: Expected vote shares of rump and splinter parties: cross-national analysis
Note: Simulations of expected vote shares with 95% confidence intervals. The values of other
variables are held constant at their mean values.
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the vote share of the rump party by 0.71 percentage point. Thus, the change in the size of relative
size of party membership by 4.9 percentage points on average increases the vote share of the rump
party by approximately 3.5 percentage points.
The evidence supporting Hypothesis 4 is also relatively strong. The membership of the parent
party has a significant effect in Model 2 although not in Model 6; while the membership of the
splinter party has a significant effect in Models 3 (at the 0.01 level of significance) and 7 (at the 0.1
level of significance). With regard to substantive effects, Figure 2 shows (based on the estimates of
Model 3) that when the ratio between the membership size and the electorate increases from 0.01
percent (the 10th percentile of the observed distribution) to 0.3 percent (the 90th percentile of the
distribution), the expected vote share of the splinter party increases by more than 1 percentage
point. The substantive effect of this variable as estimated in Model 7 is of similar magnitude.
The membership variable remains a statistically significant predictor of the electoral success of
rump and splinter parties in most regression models for both sub-samples. Although the substan-
tive effect of the membership of splinter parties seems to be substantially larger in Central and
Eastern Europe (compare Models 11 and 15 with Models 19 and 23), the large number of missing
observations in these models limits the extent to which strong inferences about regional differences
can be made.
Electoral demands, institutions and party competition
The results also show some support to the demand-side, institutional and party competition
explanations. Specifically, government parties that experience splits benefit from good economic
conditions. Every additional point in economic growth increases their support by half a percentage
point (based on the estimates of Model 5).15 However, low or negative economic growth does not
increase the vote share of splinter parties (regardless of whether rump parties are in government
or not). This finding stands in contrast to the studies that find the substantial effects of economic
performance on the initial electoral success of new parties (Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-
Najera, 2016; Tavits, 2008). This suggests that the latter relationship may hold only for genuinely
new parties. The significant and positive effect of economic growth on the combined vote share of
15The effect of economic growth is less reliable in post-communist democracies where, as argued by previous studies
(Roberts, 2010), government parties lose elections even in good economic times.
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Table 2: Electoral competition after splits: Western Europe
Linear multi-level regression Robust regression
Rump Splinter Rump+ Rump Splinter Rump+
splinter splinter
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Intercept 0.42 −0.87 0.78 0.74∗ 3.94 −0.31 −1.77 1.19
(0.45) (0.75) (1.12) (0.37) (2.67) (0.61) (1.59) (2.69)
Share of splinter MPs −0.17∗ 0.65∗ 0.35∗ −0.03 −0.84∗ 0.47∗ 0.40∗ −0.31
(0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.05) (0.32) (0.07) (0.13) (0.32)
Member-electorate ratio (parent party) 0.15∗ 0.11 0.13∗ 0.09 0.09∗ 0.08
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.18)
Member-electorate ratio (splinter party) 0.24∗ 2.61
(0.09) (1.50)
Socdem or communist & high −0.01 0.01 0.35 0.03 −1.95∗ −0.01 0.44 −1.34
union density (0.09) (0.14) (0.22) (0.07) (0.91) (0.21) (0.44) (0.90)
Parent party age −0.04 0.09 0.21∗ 0.00 −0.02 0.01 0.01∗ −0.00
(0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Economic growth −0.02 0.00 0.12 −0.02 0.04 −0.06 0.15 0.12
(0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.02) (0.29) (0.07) (0.23) (0.30)
Rump party in government −0.36∗ 0.13 0.10 −0.32∗ −3.25∗ 0.07 0.62 −2.90∗
(0.12) (0.21) (0.45) (0.10) (1.33) (0.30) (0.85) (1.34)
Rump party in gov * economic growth 0.08 0.03 −0.04 0.08∗ 0.58 0.13 −0.18 0.51
(0.04) (0.07) (0.16) (0.03) (0.44) (0.10) (0.32) (0.44)
Effective electoral threshold 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.65 −0.87 0.49 1.78
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (3.94) (0.95) (2.03) (3.94)
Direct public funding for leg. parties only 0.10 −0.22 −0.41 0.07 1.83 −0.40 −0.27 1.55
(0.12) (0.21) (0.27) (0.10) (1.10) (0.26) (0.50) (1.09)
Effective number of parties −0.01 0.12∗ 0.06 −0.01 −0.61∗ 0.12 0.26 −0.30
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.29) (0.06) (0.15) (0.28)
No of zero categories 0.00 −0.00 −0.03 0.01 0.11 −0.00 −0.01 0.18
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10)
Different party families 0.02 0.08 0.32 0.05 −0.33 −0.03 0.20 −0.45
(0.08) (0.14) (0.25) (0.07) (0.89) (0.21) (0.55) (0.90)
Splinter in government 0.32 0.24 −0.02 0.25 1.97 0.15 0.14 2.28
(0.20) (0.33) (0.44) (0.16) (2.30) (0.58) (0.97) (2.31)
Multiple splits −0.23 −0.17 0.25 −0.22∗ −2.40 −0.35 −0.12 −2.52
(0.13) (0.18) (0.36) (0.11) (1.28) (0.25) (0.59) (1.28)
Previous vote 0.93∗ 0.13 −0.02 0.81∗ 0.95∗ 0.01 0.01 0.98∗
(0.08) (0.14) (0.15) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Party-level variance 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.02
Election-level variance 0.00 0.08 0.19 0.00
Country-level variance 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01
Residual variance 0.10 0.29 0.35 0.07
Number of parties 69 66 35 69
Number of elections 76 76 39 76
Number of countries 14 14 12 14
N 107 118 46 107 107 118 46 107
Log Likelihood -74.95 -133.40 -53.06 -57.39
Note: dependent variables in Models 1-4 are logged vote shares of rump and splinter parties and the variables capturing the share
of splinter MPs, membership-electorate ratio, party age and effective threshold are also logged in these models. MM-estimator
used for robust regression models. ∗p < 0.05
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Table 3: Electoral competition after splits: Central and Eastern Europe
Linear multi-level regression Robust regression
Rump Splinter Rump+ Rump Splinter Rump+
splinter splinter
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Intercept 0.86 −1.06 −1.99 0.15 5.25 −0.60 −0.82 1.83
(0.59) (0.68) (1.35) (0.51) (4.18) (0.85) (2.61) (4.88)
Share of splinter MPs −0.10 0.40∗ 0.19 0.05 −0.73∗ 0.26∗ −0.04 0.02
(0.09) (0.07) (0.20) (0.08) (0.25) (0.06) (0.15) (0.29)
Member-electorate ratio (parent party) 0.10 0.16∗ 0.13∗ 1.71∗ 0.06 1.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.50) (0.09) (0.58)
Member-electorate ratio (splinter party) 0.28∗ 31.97∗
(0.10) (3.68)
Socdem or communist & high 0.38 −0.03 0.38 0.28 6.05∗ −0.24 3.05 3.93
union density (0.22) (0.24) (0.55) (0.19) (2.23) (0.43) (1.98) (2.59)
Parent party age −0.06 −0.08 0.03 0.00 −0.04 −0.02 −0.04 0.02
(0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.09) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
Economic growth −0.00 0.03 −0.02 −0.00 −0.14 0.01 −0.26 −0.23
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.26) (0.05) (0.24) (0.30)
Rump party in government −0.58∗ 0.29 0.12 −0.42∗ −5.69∗ 0.48 1.43 −6.18∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.41) (0.16) (1.85) (0.36) (1.56) (2.16)
Rump in gov * economic growth 0.05 −0.06 −0.01 0.02 0.64 −0.09 −0.20 0.65
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.34) (0.07) (0.29) (0.39)
Effective electoral threshold 0.11 −0.22 −0.43 −0.04 8.42 −1.26 −14.13∗ 2.11
(0.13) (0.17) (0.28) (0.11) (10.42) (1.92) (5.90) (12.21)
Direct public funding for leg. parties only 0.07 −0.85∗ −1.03∗ −0.28 1.36 −1.19∗ −4.21∗ 0.19
(0.22) (0.28) (0.40) (0.19) (2.36) (0.52) (1.21) (2.74)
Effective number of parties −0.03 0.15∗ 0.19∗ 0.05 −0.22 0.11 0.62∗ 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.46) (0.10) (0.24) (0.53)
No of zero categories −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.05 0.08∗ 0.01 0.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.17) (0.03) (0.10) (0.20)
Different party families 0.07 0.24 0.50 0.29∗ 1.45 0.28 −0.43 4.36∗
(0.16) (0.15) (0.29) (0.14) (1.67) (0.34) (0.94) (1.95)
Splinter in government −0.44 −0.07 −0.68 −0.36 −1.79 −0.16 −4.91∗ −2.92
(0.29) (0.28) (0.54) (0.25) (3.06) (0.62) (2.05) (3.51)
Multiple splits −0.57∗ −0.31 −0.01 −0.44∗ −5.09∗ −0.15 −1.40 −2.67
(0.20) (0.19) (0.32) (0.17) (2.00) (0.33) (1.04) (2.35)
Previous vote 0.89∗ 0.10 0.45 0.77∗ 0.53∗ 0.02 0.09∗ 0.66∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.12) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04) (0.09)
Party-level variance 0.00 0.21 0.12 0.00
Election-level variance 0.00 0.07 0.36 0.00
Country-level variance 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Residual variance 0.45 0.27 0.26 0.33
Number of parties 66 62 41 66
Number of elections 44 44 33 44
Number of countries 11 11 11 11
N 85 110 52 85 85 110 52 85
Log Likelihood -103.06 -131.07 -68.68 -92.70
Note: dependent variables in Models 1-4 are logged vote shares of rump and splinter parties and the variables capturing the share
of splinter MPs, membership-electorate ratio, party age and effective threshold are also logged in these models. MM-estimator
used for robust regression models. ∗p < 0.05
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successor parties when the rump party is in government (Model 8) provides further evidence that
poor economic performance leads incumbent rump parties to lose votes not to their splinters, but
to other parties in the system.
However, the arguments in the literature on the importance of cleavage structures and voter
partisanship for new party success provide limited leverage for understanding electoral competition
after splits. Thus, although according to Model 21 rump leftist parties that compete in the en-
vironments of relatively high trade union density lose fewer votes in Central and Eastern Europe
(in line with theoretical expectations), the same variable has a negative effect on the vote share of
rump parties in Western Europe (Model 13) and in neither sub-sample it is a significant predictor
of the support of splinter parties. The evidence that the age of the parent party affects the support
of either rump or splinter parties is also limited.
Turning to institutional explanations, electoral system disproportionality has no effect on the
vote share of rump or splinter parties, but the public funding regime that favours legislative parties
reduces the support of splinter parties, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. These findings
indicate that the effects of “funding parity” on new and small party success (Potter and Tavits,
2015) are also applicable to splinter parties.
The effective number of parties is also related to the individual but not combined electoral
performance of rump and splinter parties. Specifically, the estimates of Model 5 indicate that the
electoral support of rump parties decreases by 0.84 percentage points for each additional “effective
party” - or by 3.8 points when the effective number of parties increases from the 10th to the
90th percentile of the observed distribution (3.1 and 7.6 parties, respectively).16 Furthermore, a
higher effective number of parties increases the electoral performance of splinter parties (the effect is
present in both regions), although the substantive size of the effect is rather modest (each additional
effective party increases the support of splinter parties by 0.13 percentage points according to Model
6). Overall, these results indicate support to the argument in literature on initial success of new
parties (Mainwaring, Gervasoni and España-Najera, 2016) that the supporters of the parent party
are more likely to support the new splinter party when party system fragmentation is high.
Another party competition variable - ideological families of successor parties - is a statistically
significant predictor of the total vote share of successor parties (although in the analyses for Western
16However, the effect is not statistically or substantively significant in the post-communist sub-sample.
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Europe only) and, in some models, of the support of splinter parties (Model 2). The stronger effect
in post-communist countries may be a consequence of lower diversity in parties’ positions (Roberts,
2010) and lower dimensionality of party systems (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2012) in this region,
which allows new splinter parties to attract more voters if they provide ideological innovations as
compared to their parent parties. However, there was no evidence that the third variable of party
competition - the diversity of established parties’ programmes - is important for the outcomes
of electoral competition after splits. In combination these findings provide some support to the
arguments in the research on new parties on the impact of policy and issue competition on new
party success.
Among the control variables, the vote share of the parent parties has a strong effect on the
support of rump parties and the combined support of successor parties but not on the vote share of
splinter parties. These results support the descriptive patterns presented in Figure 1. In contrast,
the presence of splinter parties in government seems to be inconsequential for the support of either
rump or splinter parties.
Conclusion
This study aimed to map the patterns of party electoral performance in the first election after
party fission and to explain the variation in them. The cross-national analysis of 25 countries
in Europe suggests a number of new results and important implications. First, the study shows
that the patterns of electoral competition after splits in Western Europe and Central and Eastern
Europe are quite similar, thus providing an important contribution to the debate on the differences
between the two regions in terms of their parties and party systems.
Second, the study finds that splinter parties, on average, attract limited support. However, those
parties that include a substantial number of legislators from the parent party and build at least some
organization on the ground are more electorally successful. The electoral success of splinter parties
also depends on political opportunity structures, such as party system fragmentation and favourable
public party funding regimes, but no support was found for demand-side explanations. Given
the substantial evidence in line with the electoral demand, institutional and party competition
explanations of new party electoral performance, the findings of the present research suggest that
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the factors explaining the electoral support of genuinely new and splinter parties may be different.
Third, the study also shows that most parties withstand the electoral competition after party
splits relatively unscathed. Nevertheless, a split may be highly damaging if the party loses a
substantial share of its legislators to the splinter party and if it lacks a large strong membership.
Splits also do not affect the well-established effect of economic indicators on the electoral support of
government parties. However, apart from party system fragmentation, the relevance of institutional
and party competition factors explaining the support of rump parties is limited. By addressing a
previously under-researched but important question of how parties perform after splits, the present
study makes an important contribution to the literature on party electoral persistence.
Finally, the study also demonstrates that the combined support of rump and splinter parties
in the first election after the split is on average close to the electoral performance of the parent
party in the last election before fission. However, other parties in the system are more likely to
benefit from splits of their competitors if the latter splits multiple times in the same electoral term,
lack large memberships and represent similar ideologies. These findings shed light on the broader
electoral consequences of fission and legislative party switching in the party system beyond the
electoral fate of splinter parties or the parties that experience splits.
23
References
Aimer, Peter and Jack Vowles. 1993. Voters’ vengeance: 1990 election in New Zealand and the fate
of the fourth Labour Government. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Andersen, Robert. 2008. Modern methods for robust regression. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Anderson, Christopher J. 2000. “Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspec-
tive.” Electoral Studies 19(2):151–170.
Art, David. 2011. Inside the radical right: The development of anti-immigrant parties in Western
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bakke, Elisabeth and Nick Sitter. 2013. “Why do parties fail? Cleavages, government fatigue
and electoral failure in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 1992–2012.” East European
Politics 29(2):208–225.
Barnea, Shlomit and Gideon Rahat. 2011. “Out with the old, in with the new: What constitutes
a new party?” Party Politics 17(3):303–320.
Biezen, Ingrid van. 2013. “Party Law in Modern Europe.”.
URL: http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/
Bolin, Niklas. 2010. “How new parties shape their own fate: an actor-centered framework for anal-
ysis.” Presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin, Ireland, 30 August - 1 September,
2010.
Bolleyer, Nicole. 2013. New Parties in Old Party Systems: Persistence and Decline in Seventeen
Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bugajski, Janusz. 2002. Political Parties of Eastern Europe: a Guide to Politics in the Post-
Communist Era. New York: ME Sharpe Inc.
Carey, John M. and Simon Hix. 2011. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional
Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55(2):383–397.
Carter, Elisabeth. 2005. The extreme right in Western Europe: Success or failure? Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Ceron, Andrea. 2015. “The Politics of Fission: An Analysis of Faction Breakaways among Italian
Parties (1946–2011).” British Journal of Political Science 45(1):121–139.
Crewe, Ivor and Anthony King. 1995. SDP: the birth, life and death of the Social Democratic Party.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. and Steven Weldon. 2007. “Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization.”
Party Politics 13(2):179–196.
Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s
Chamber of Deputies.” American Journal of Political Science 50(1):62–80.
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